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Abstract
Prosumers are active participants in future energy systems who produce and consume energy. However, the emerging role of
prosumers brings challenges of tracing carbon emissions behaviours and formulating pricing scheme targeting on individual pro-
sumption behaviours. This paper proposes a novel blockchain-based peer-to-peer trading framework to trade energy and carbon
allowance. The bidding/selling prices of prosumers can directly incentivise the reshaping of prosumption behaviours to achieve
regional energy balance and carbon emissions mitigation. A decentralised low carbon incentive mechanism is formulated target-
ing on specific prosumption behaviours. Case studies using the modified IEEE 37-bus test feeder show that the proposed trading
framework can export 0.99kWh of daily energy and save 1465.90g daily carbon emissions, outperforming the existing centralised
trading and aggregator-based trading.
Keywords: blockchain, carbon mitigation, peer-to-peer energy trading, renewable energy sources, smart contract.
1. Introduction
In energy sector, a majority of power demand is supplied
by centralised fossil-fuelled generation including coal, gas, and
oil [1]. Enormous carbon emissions are produced by the com-
bustion of fossil fuels and energy loss of long-distance trans-
mission, which leads to air pollution and irreversible effects
of climate change [2]. To address this environmental issue,
policy makers facilitate distributed renewable energy sources
(DRESs) to be integrated into distribution systems [3]. Mean-
while, the carbon pricing scheme is formulated as a market-
based climate policy to let carbon producers pay for allowance
of carbon emissions [4]. The advances of smart grids enable in-
creasing number of consumers to produce or store electricity at
home through DRESs and batteries, leading to a new concept:
prosumers. The term of prosumers was coined by Alvin Toffler
in 1980 [5]. In the field of the DRESs, prosumers are residen-
tial households or businesses, e.g. energy retailers and indus-
tries, which actively produce surplus energy and feed into a dis-
tribution network after self-consumption; When prosumers de-
mand can not be met by self-generation, they consume energy
from grids [6]. Although the emerging role of prosumers pro-
vides opportunities for local energy trading to achieve regional
supply-demand balance of energy, there are several challenges.
First, it is challenging to trace the carbon emissions caused by
prosumption behaviours, in particular if distributed prosumers
generate and consume energy simultaneously. Second, the cen-
tralised wholesale energy pricing is determined by the supply-
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demand balance between generators and retailers, and the cen-
tralised retail energy pricing, e.g. flat pricing, time-of-use pric-
ing, and real-time pricing, is determined by the supply-demand
balance between retailers and consumers [7]; The centralised
carbon pricing is determined by the emissions trading scheme
(ETS) [8]. These prices dynamically fluctuate with the supply-
demand balance of overall markets and are uniform for all cus-
tomers. Because these prices are independent of the exchange
of energy or carbon allowance among individual prosumers, not
every prosumer can be efficiently incentivised to reduce car-
bon emissions and participate in energy trading. Third, when
prosumers proceed peer-to-peer trading, it is hard to ensure the
settlement and delivery without a standardised negotiation and
enforcing mechanism.
For the first challenge, tracing carbon emissions using power
flow analysis is a solution. Researchers in [9] implemented
the concept of carbon emissions flow (CEF) as a virtual net-
work flow concurrent with power flow to trace carbon emis-
sions caused by electricity generation, transmission, and con-
sumption. The CEF approach was further investigated in [10]
to formulate a mathematical model for calculating the CEF of
each bus in power networks. Chen et al. [11] implemented the
coupling of power flow and CEF into carbon intensity analysis
of urban nexus. Nonetheless, when prosumers participate in the
local energy trading, the prosumption behaviours include gener-
ation for self-consumption, consumption from self-generation,
and generation (or consumption) for (or from) energy exchange
with other prosumers. How to identify the CEF caused by these
specific prosumption behaviours, and allocate responsibilities
and credits for carbon reduction needs to be further investi-
gated.
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For the second challenge, designing a pricing incentive
scheme targeting on individual prosumption behaviours is a
complement approach for the centralised market pricing. Chiu
et al. [12] proposed an energy pricing scheme to manage the en-
ergy imbalance caused by the integration of DRESs. The policy
of feed-in tariff was implemented in energy markets to compen-
sate renewable energy generators based on the generating costs
of each source [13]. In the carbon markets, carbon price floor
and ceiling were designed to complement the centralised price
of the ETS by setting an additional price limits for the carbon
emissions producers in certain regions [14]. For the case of
the U.K. carbon market, because the carbon price of the E.U.
ETS lay below the estimated carbon cost of the U.K. coal-fired
generation, the carbon pricing scheme failed to incentivise the
U.K. coal-to-gas transition before 2013 [8]. Afterwards, the
U.K. formulated the carbon price support for its own carbon
producers as an additional carbon price of the E.U. ETS [15].
The U.S. set a similar price floor and facilitated carbon auc-
tions in 2009 [16]. By contrast, in New Zealand, a carbon price
ceiling was enacted through fixed price option to prevent high
carbon price and protect market competitiveness of generators
[17]. Further research efforts have been dedicated to decen-
tralising the pricing schemes in both energy and carbon mar-
kets. Ghosh et al. [18] proposed a platform to set the energy
exchange prices for prosumers for the purpose of maximising
the amount of energy exchange and reducing the consumption
from conventional generation. Zhang et al. [19] developed a
peer-to-peer system architecture based on game theory. A dy-
namic pricing for decentralized energy trading in microgrids is
designed in [20]. Gkatzikis et al. [21] partitioned the power
networks into several regions and introduced the role of aggre-
gators as regional agents to formulate regional prices for their
consumers. Li et al. [22] extended the function of aggregators
to deliver the demand side management and DRESs for regional
energy balance. Fan et al. [23] decentralised the carbon price
by evaluating consumer’s carbon emissions behaviours.
For the third challenge, blockchain technology (one of the
distributed ledger technologies) [24] has the potential of estab-
lishing a decentralised trading platform with automated trading
procedures and protected residential privacy. As one of the key
blockchain technologies, smart contract enables executable pro-
grams to be performed in a manner of self-enforcing settlement
and setting out negotiation [25]. The features of replicable, se-
cure, and verifiable of smart contract [26] enable the trading,
negotiation and agreement to become more trustworthy with-
out the interference of centralised authority. In energy markets,
the distribution of power losses to each transaction was investi-
gated under the blockchain based microgrids [27]. Li et al. [28]
applied smart contract into a distributed hybrid energy systems
to facilitate energy exchange among end users. A combined
analysis of optimal power flow and smart contract based energy
trading was performed in [29], and the results demonstrated
that the costs and peak energy imports were dramatically re-
duced. Kang et al. [30] proposed a localised peer-to-peer trad-
ing model for energy exchange among plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles. Thomas et al. [31] applied the smart contract for con-
trolling energy transfer process between separate distribution
Table 1
Comparison between centralised trading and localised trading.
Centralised trading Peer-to-peer trading
Primary energy supplier Large scale generators Prosumers with DRESs
Pricing scheme Centralised prices Bidding/selling prices
Contract type Idiosyncratic contract [34] Standardised smart contract
Settlement enforcing [25] Legal restraint Self-enforcing
Trustee [25] Third party Smart meter & smart contract
Incentive supplier Policy maker [16] Consensus of network
Incentive update Long-term policy [16] Real-time update
networks. In carbon markets, Khaqqi et al. [32] customised
carbon allowance trading to industries using reputation based
blockchain for encouraging low carbon behaviours. The appli-
cation of blockchain in cap-and-trade scheme of carbon markets
was investigated in [33].
Although extensive studies have been conducted to address
those challenges, there are three major gaps as follows.
• The individual prosumers’ carbon emissions caused by
generation for self-consumption, consumption from self-
generation, and generation (or consumption) for (or from)
energy exchange with other prosumers cannot be traced
using existing approaches and then incentivised properly.
This is more challenging when prosumers trade energy or
carbon allowance, because they need to know how much
carbon allowance needs to be purchased as carbon cost.
• Existing pricing schemes are not prosumer-centric. A new
peer-to-peer energy trading needs to be designed, under
which the bidding/selling prices of prosumers in energy
and carbon markets are able to directly incentivise the re-
shaping of prosumption profiles to achieve carbon emis-
sions reduction and regional energy balance.
• Separately designing energy or carbon markets is not ef-
ficient, because the purchasing of carbon allowance is a
part of energy costs. A decentralised trading framework
needs to be designed enabling prosumers to trade energy
and carbon allowance together.
This paper proposes a novel peer-to-peer energy and carbon
allowance joint trading framework to address these gaps. The
primary differences between conventional centralised trading
and our proposed blockchain based peer-to-peer trading are pre-
sented in Table 1. This paper offers following contributions.
• A carbon emissions tracing approach targeting on individ-
ual prosumers’ behaviours is developed to ensure a fair
allocation of low carbon incentives.
• A new trading framework is designed enabling the ex-
change of energy and carbon allowance at both prosumer
level and microgrid level, using a smart contract based
trading platform. The proposed energy scheduling algo-
rithms interact with the self-enforcing nature of smart con-
tract to automate standardised auction procedure.
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• Case studies show that the proposed trading framework
achieves better energy balance and carbon-saving than
those of centralised trading and aggregator-based trading.
The remaining parts of this paper are summarised as follows.
Section 2 presents the proposed three-layer trading framework.
Corresponding to each layer, the details of problem formulation
and the smart contract based auction mechanism are described
in Section 3. The results of case studies are presented in Section
4. Section 5 draws the conclusion and lists the future work.
2. Trading Framework
This section describes the overall trading framework under
which both energy and carbon allowance are exchanged within
distribution networks. According to the commercial relations of
market participants, i.e. prosumer and microgrid-trader (MT),
as described in [19], the trading procedure is hierarchically cat-
egorised into three layers: prosumer-centric trading, MT-centric
trading, and peer-to-peer trading platform. Fig. 1 shows the
architecture and information flows of these three layers. The
proposed framework is implemented in the day-ahead market
to schedule energy prosumption and perform trading for the
following day. The prosumers in the context of our research
refer to a master of energy prosumption [5] which seeks for
personal benefits, i.e. bill-saving or cost-saving, and environ-
mental goal, i.e. carbon emissions reduction, by participating in
both energy and carbon markets using their DRESs. Ethereum
blockchain network [35] is used consisting of full nodes and
light nodes. The market operator acts as full nodes to provide
and manage the trading platform by offering computing power
for block mining, storing all blocks, and earning rewards for
mined blocks. Prosumers and MTs act as light nodes to store
header chain and verify transactions. As the light nodes, pro-
sumers and MTs do not need powerful computers. Hence, the
trading process can be supported by smart meters or mobile
phones. The specific design of each layer is described as fol-
lows and the problem formulation will be detailed in Section
3.
2.1. Prosumer-Centric Trading
The layer of prosumer-centric trading aims at using collected
metering data to help individual prosumers make optimal deci-
sions of reshaping prosumption profile and bidding prices. The
optimal decisions are yielded by solving optimisation problems
with the objective of minimising electricity bills for buyers or
maximising profits for sellers. The optimal decisions of re-
shaped prosumption are implemented by controllers, and the
optimal decisions of bidding prices are sent to smart contract for
auctions. Through evaluating the carbon emissions behaviours,
blockchain automatically updates monetary incentives for in-
dividual prosumers. For regional energy balance and reducing
transmission loss, prosumer-centric trading only applies for an
ensemble of prosumers geographically in the same microgrid.
The advantages of prosumer-centric trading are: 1) the reshap-
ing of prosumption behaviours is directly incentivised by pro-
sumers’ bidding or selling prices, instead of central authority
such as aggregator or energy retailer [22]; 2) the monetary in-
centive for carbon reduction is directly linked with individual
prosumers considering their carbon emissions behaviours.
2.2. Microgrid-Trader-Centric Trading
A group of physically connected prosumers is managed by a
virtual entity, MT [19]. On the layer of MT-centric trading, MT
aggregates the residual supply and demand of energy and car-
bon allowance for its ensemble of prosumers to trade with other
MTs. The optimal decisions of bidding prices are also yielded
by solving optimisation problems with the same objectives as
those of prosumer-centric trading. The aim of MT-centric trad-
ing is to help an ensemble of prosumers in the same microgrid
balance supply and demand by exchanging with other micro-
grids.
2.3. Peer-to-Peer Trading Platform
The layer of peer-to-peer trading platform aims to provide a
standardised negotiation and self-enforcing settlement for en-
abling buyers and sellers to proceed the trading of energy and
carbon allowance. These functions are achieved by smart con-
tract in the form of ‘if an event happens, pay an amount of cur-
rency to the receiver on the self-enforcing basis’ [36]. In this
paper, the event is the delivery of energy or carbon allowance
which can be ensured by querying the smart meter.
The execution of smart contract includes initialisation,
matching bids and offers, bidding, winner selection, and own-
ership exchange. The seller initialises the smart contract by
specifying offer conditions. Buyers who meet the conditions
will be optimally matched to deposit their bids on smart con-
tract for auction. Until the auction ended, the buyer with the
highest bid wins the auction. The rest of buyers can withdraw
their deposits from smart contract. The smart contract directly
queries the smart meter to ensure that agreed energy or carbon
allowance is supplied by the seller at the agreed time, before
transferring the highest buyer’s deposited bid to the seller.
All the transactions are stored, shared and audited by full
nodes to validate authenticity and accuracy. The validated
transactions are structured in publicly available blocks. The
blocks are chronologically chained to each other through in-
volving the hash of previous block into the current block,
forming a blockchain. The validation is collectively achieved
by all nodes through reaching a consensus of proof-of-work
[37] which uses secure hash algorithm SHA-256 to protect
all blocks. The inputs of SHA-256 are block number, nonce,
timestamp, and hash output of previous block, and the output of
SHA-256 is a fixed-length digest as an unique identity of block.
This unique identity is guaranteed by specially mined nonce
and collectively verification of all nodes, which means that if
a malicious node changes one block, a different nonce will re-
sult in an unverified block, and if a malicious node changes all
blocks, it will be extremely computationally difficult. There-
fore, the chaining feature of blockchain and difficulty of solving
a proof-of-work enable transactions to be traceable, verifiable
and tempering resistance.
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Fig. 1. Proposed framework of peer-to-peer energy trading. (A) Individual prosumers trade energy or carbon allowance on the layer of prosumer-centric trading.
(B) The residual supply and demand for an ensemble of prosumers in the same microgrid are aggregated and traded by microgrid-traders on the layer of microgrid-
trader-centric trading. (C) The trading of energy or carbon allowance is proceeded on the layer of peer-to-peer trading platform.
3. Problem Formulation
This section describes the problem formulation of hierarchi-
cal 3-layer trading framework.
3.1. Decentralised Low Carbon Incentive Mechanism
In the conventional power systems, carbon emissions from
large scale fossil-fuelled generators need to be traced [38]. Ac-
cording to the policy of carbon markets [39], these large scale
fossil-fuelled generators report their annual fuel usage and elec-
tricity supply to evaluate the efficiency of electricity supply.
With the information of the efficiency of electricity supply and
carbon intensities of fuels [40], the carbon content of electricity
supply can be traced [41]. By contrast, with the DRESs, pro-
sumers play a role as both generators and consumers. New car-
bon tracing approaches should be designed to distinguish the
following portions of carbon emissions: 1) carbon emissions
caused by using prosumers’ own generation for meeting their
own demand; 2) carbon emissions caused by using prosumers’
own generation for supplying other prosumers’ demand; 3) car-
bon emissions caused by prosumers’ demand being supplied by
other prosumers’ generation.
Building on existing work [10], we aim to investigate the
CEF in a microgrid considering the bidirectional power flow
caused by energy trading. The CEF represents a concurrent vir-
tual network flow with power flow, which is ejected from out-
flowing buses, and delivered to inflowing buses. By abstracting
network features, the carbon emissions caused by prosumers’
behaviours at each bus can be evaluated.
A schematic illustration of how to trace the aforementioned
three portions of carbon emissions is presented in Fig. 2. Let
I denote the index set of energy sources and K denote the in-
dex set of loads of a prosumer. In Fig. 2 and (1), ri,t denotes
the carbon emissions rate caused by power generation of source
i ∈ I at scheduling time t, and rk,t denotes the carbon emissions
rate caused by power consumption behaviour of load k ∈ K
at scheduling time t, with unit of g/h. Prosumer A generates
Fig. 2. Schematic illustration of carbon emissions tracing in a microgrid. Pro-
sumer A supplies surplus energy to prosumer B. Prosumer A needs to have the
carbon allowance (rAallow,t) when supplying energy to prosumer B.
surplus energy after meeting its own demand, and supplies the
surplus energy to prosumer B who is unable to generate enough
energy to meet its own demand. The portion of carbon emis-
sions caused by using prosumer A and prosumer B’ s own gen-
eration for meeting their own demand can be quantified by rAk,t
and rBk,t, respectively. In addition, the portion of carbon emis-
sions caused by using prosumers’ own generation for supplying








where rnet,t denotes the amount of carbon emissions caused
by using prosumers’ own generation for supplying other pro-
sumers’ demand at scheduling time t. Hence, as shown in Fig.
2, the portion of carbon emissions caused by using prosumer
A’s own generation for supplying prosumer B’ s demand can be
quantified by rAnet,t which is the same amount for the portion of
carbon emissions caused by prosumer B’s demand being sup-
plied by prosumer A’s generation.
Once these amounts of carbon emissions are traced, the low
carbon incentive can be formulated for individual prosumers in
a form of monetary compensation. When a prosumer supplies
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energy to other prosumers, this prosumer needs to have the car-
bon allowance as a permission of pollutant emitting [39]. Ac-
cording to the research in [42], the initial carbon allowance is
assigned by the blockchain system based on the carbon inten-
sities of prosumer’s generation sources and carbon reduction
target of an ensemble of prosumers. In Fig. 2 and (2), rallow,t
denotes the carbon allowance of a prosumer at scheduling time
t. If rnet,t > rallow,t, a prosumer has to buy the carbon allowance
from other prosumers; If rnet,t < rallow,t, a prosumer can not
only sell the extra carbon allowance to other prosumers, but
also receive monetary compensation generated by the consen-
sus of peer-to-peer trading networks. Additionally, to ensure
the high-carbon prosumers to be primarily targeted, the mon-
etary compensation at high-level of carbon emissions is higher
than that at low-level of carbon emissions, which means that the









> 0, where γ (·) denotes
the monetary compensation function of a prosumer with unit of












· ∆t, rallow,t > rnet,t,
0, rallow,t ≤ rnet,t,
(2)
where α denotes the monetary compensation rate with unit of
£/g.
3.2. Prosumer-Centric Algorithm
The prosumer-centric trading enables prosumers in the same
microgrid to exchange energy or carbon allowance with neigh-
bouring prosumers for the purpose of regional balance. When
a prosumer is unable to generate enough energy to meet its
own demand, this prosumer needs to buy energy from other
prosumers as an energy buyer. The objective of a prosumer
as an energy buyer is to minimise its bills by strategically de-





























 ·∆t · benergy,t≤π, (5)
where dk,t denotes the power consumption of a prosumer’s load
k ∈ K at scheduling time t, gi,t denotes the power genera-
tion of a prosumer’s own source i ∈ I at scheduling time t,
benergy,t denotes the bidding price of a prosumer at scheduling
time t for buying energy, with unit of £/kWh, ∆t denotes the
scheduling interval, Tbuyer denotes the index set of scheduling
time for an energy buyer, π denotes the account balance of a
buyer with unit of £, and bhighestenergy,t denotes the highest bidding
price for the energy selling at scheduling time t over all en-
ergy buyers updated by the blockchain network. Let Benergy,t
denote the set of bidding prices submitted by all energy buy-
ers for the offer of selling energy at scheduling time t. Hence,
bhighestenergy,t = max : Benergy,t.
When a prosumer generates surplus energy after meeting
its own demand, this prosumer can sell the surplus energy to
other prosumers as an energy seller. Recall that in Section 3.1,
when a prosumer sells energy to other prosumers, this prosumer
needs to have the carbon allowance. When the assigned car-
bon allowance rallow,t is given, if rnet,t > rallow,t, a prosumer
has to buy the carbon allowance as a part of generating cost;
If rallow,t > rnet,t, a prosumer can sell the extra carbon allowance
and be compensated as a part of revenue. The trading of carbon

















where ccarbon (·) denotes the carbon cost (or revenue) function of
an energy seller with unit of £, bcarbon,t denotes the bidding price
of a prosumer at scheduling time t for buying carbon allowance
with unit of £/g, and bhighestcarbon,t denotes the highest bidding price
for the carbon allowance selling at scheduling time t over all
carbon allowance buyers updated by the blockchain network.
Let Bcarbon,t denote the set of bidding prices submitted by all
the carbon allowance buyers for the offer of selling carbon al-
lowance at scheduling time t, bhighestcarbon,t = max : Bcarbon,t. When
rallow,t > rnet,t, ccarbon is negative indicating the revenue of sell-
ing carbon allowance.
Apart from the carbon cost, other generating costs are evalu-









where δi denotes the cost coefficient of source i with unit of
£/kWh.
The objective of a prosumer as an energy seller is to max-
imise its profits by strategically deciding the bidding price of

































bhighestcarbon,t < bcarbon,t, 0 < ccarbon ≤ π, (10)
where Tseller denotes the index set of scheduling time for an
energy seller. The decision variable bcarbon,t and (10) only hold
when a prosumer buys carbon allowance.
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3.3. Microgrid-Trader-Centric Algorithm
After the completion of the prosumer-centric trading, there
might be residual supply or demand which cannot be met in-
side the microgrid due to the surplus or scarcity generation of
all prosumers in the same microgrid. The MT-centric trading
aims to help an ensemble of prosumers in the same microgrid
aggregate the residual supply and demand. Through solving
(3)-(5) or (8)-(10) in the prosumer-centric algorithm, the opti-
mal power generation of source i and power consumption of
load k for an individual prosumer at each scheduling time t are
yielded, denoted as g∗i,t and d
∗
k,t. Let N denote the index set of
prosumers in the same microgrid. The total power generation










where gn,t denotes the total power generation of prosumer n ∈
N at scheduling time t, and dn,t denotes the total power con-
sumption of prosumer n ∈ N at scheduling time t.
When an ensemble of prosumers in the same microgrid is un-





needs to help its prosumers buy energy from other microgrids
or import from main grid. The objective of MT as an energy
buyer is to minimise overall electricity bills for its prosumers





















When an ensemble of prosumers in the same microgrid gen-
erates surplus energy after meeting their own demand, i.e.∑
n∈N gn,t >
∑
n∈N dn,t, MT can help its prosumers sell energy
to other microgrids. Meanwhile, MT can help its energy sell-
ers trade residual carbon allowance with other microgrids. If
the net carbon emissions of an ensemble of prosumers in the
same microgrid exceed the carbon allowance of this microgrid,
MT has to help its prosumers buy carbon allowance from other
microgrids. If the net carbon emissions of an ensemble of pro-
sumers in the same microgrid are less than the carbon allowance
of this microgrid, MT can help its prosumers sell the extra car-
bon allowance and earn the monetary compensation for its pro-
sumers. This relationship has similar format as (6). Hence, the
objective of MT as an energy seller is to maximise the overall
profits for its prosumers by strategically deciding optimal bid-














s.t. : bhighestcarbon,t < bcarbon,t, 0 < ccarbon,n ≤ π, (16)
where ccarbon,n denotes the carbon cost (or revenue) of prosumer
n, and cn denotes other costs of prosumer n.
3.4. Smart Contract Based Auction Mechanism
In the layer of peer-to-peer trading platform, the proposed
smart contract based auction mechanism is applicable for both
prosumers and MTs to trade either energy or carbon allowance,
under the standardised negotiation and self-enforcing of smart
contract. The auction consists of the following steps: initialisa-
tion, matching, bidding, withdraw, and pay-to-seller. Each step
is performed by a function of smart contract, denoted as finit (·),
fmatch (·), fbid (·), fwithdraw (·), and fpay (·), respectively. LetU de-
note the index set of sellers, andV denote the index set of buy-
ers. The trading algorithm, as shown in Algorithm 1, is written
in the Solidity language and stored in the Ethereum blockchain.
Detailed steps of executing the auction are described as:
Algorithm 1 Smart Contract Based Auction Procedure
1: function: initialisation finit (·)




4: function: matching fmatch (·)
5: for v ∈ V do
6: find optimal offers combinationU∗ by (18) (19)
7: end for
8: function: bidding fbid (·)
9: Input: τnow, b∗v,mv, πv










14: function: withdraw fwithdraw (·)
15: Input: τnow, b∗v, πv
16: require τnow > τ, v ∈ V, v , v∗ do
17: unsuccessful buyers withdraw their bids by (23)
18: end
19: Output: π′v
20: function: pay-to-seller fpay (·)
21: Input: τnow, b∗v, πv
22: require τnow > τ, v = v∗ do
23: pay the deposited highest bid to seller by (24)
24: end
25: Output: π′u
Step 1: Each seller calls the initialisation function finit (·)
from smart contract to specify the seller address, trading type
(energy or carbon allowance), seller type (prosumer or MT),
microgrid number, selling amount, minimal accepted bidding
price, the currently highest bid, and the time of auction ended
(line 1-3 in Algorithm 1) as
Ou = finit
(





where Ou denotes the offer initiated by seller u ∈ U, idu de-
notes the encrypted address of seller u, ε ∈ {0, 1} denotes a
binary value indicating if the trading type is energy or carbon
allowance, β ∈ {0, 1} denotes a binary value indicating if the
seller type is prosumer or MT, mu denotes the microgrid index
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of seller u which enables buyers to find sellers in the same mi-
crogrid, su denotes the amount of energy or carbon allowance
to be supplied by seller u, bminu,t denotes the minimal accepted
bidding price specified by seller u for the energy or carbon al-
lowance to be provided at scheduling time t, bhighestu,t denotes the
current highest bidding price (bhighestu,t = b
min
u,t at the initialisa-
tion) for the energy or carbon allowance to be provided by the
seller u at scheduling time t, and τu denotes the time of auction
ended specified by seller u. The blockchain stores and updates
the offers of all the sellers.
Step 2: In the proposed auction mechanism, each buyer needs
to bid with a higher price than the currently highest bid over all
the buyers. Hence, the matching function fmatch (·) aims to help
buyers automatically match the optimal offers combination to
submit their bids, according to the criteria of: 1) meeting the
demand of energy or carbon allowance for buyer v ∈ V, de-
noted as dv; 2) the selected optimal offers have the minimal
summation of the currently highest bidding prices, which al-
lows buyers to bid with minimal bidding prices. This criteria
can be described (line 4-7 in Algorithm 1) as
U∗v = arg minu :
∑
u∈U




su ≥ dv, (19)
whereU∗v denotes the set of optimal offers combination that can
meet buyer v’s demand with minimal required bidding prices.
Step 3: The bidding function fbid (·) enables buyers to submit
their bids after checking the conditions that: 1) the auction is
not ended, i.e. τnow ≤ τu, where τnow is the current time; 2) the
microgrid index of buyer v, denoted as mv, matches mu 3) buyer
has enough balance to provide a higher bid than the currently
highest bidding price as
bhighestu,t · su < b
∗
v · su ≤ πv, (20)
where b∗v denotes the optimal bidding price of buyer v yielded
by solving the optimization in prosumer-centric algorithm or
MT-centric algorithm, and πv denotes the account balance of
buyer v.
After a buyer successfully submits a bid, the highest bidding










u,t denotes the updated current highest bidding price
for the energy or carbon allowance to be provided by the seller
u at scheduling time t. Before the auction is ended, all the bids
are frozen by the smart contract, which means that the buyers
are unable to withdraw their bids back to their account.
Step 4: When the auction is ended, i.e.τnow > τ, the buyer
with the highest bidding price wins the auction as
v∗ = arg max
v
: Bt, (22)
where v∗ denotes the buyer with the highest bidding price, and
Bt denotes the set of bidding prices submitted by all buyers for
the energy or carbon allowance provided at scheduling time t.
The rest of unsuccessful buyers v ∈ V, v , v∗ withdraw
their previously submitted bids by calling the withdraw func-






where π′v = πv + b
∗
v · su denotes the updated account balance of
buyer v after withdrawing the bid for seller u’s offer.
Step 5: Once the smart contract confirms that the energy or
carbon allowance is delivered by querying the smart meter, the
deposited final highest bid for offer u, denoted as bhighest∗u,t is paid









where π′u = πu+b
highest∗
u,t ·su denotes the updated account balance
of seller u after receiving the payment.
4. Case Studies
Case studies are performed using the modified IEEE 37-bus
test feeder [45] as shown in Fig. 3. The network is partitioned
into five interconnected microgrids with arbitrarily assigned
diesel generators and DRESs including solar, wind, and bioen-
ergy. The coefficients of costs and carbon intensities are shown
in Supplementary Materials S 1. The loads data of residential
demand is collected by using EFERGY monitor hub (See Sup-
plementary Materials S2). The solar generation data is obtained
from the U.K. rooftop solar generation of endpoint consumers
[46], and the generation of diesel, wind, and biomass are scaled
down by 2.5×107 times from the U.K. power systems [47] (See
Supplementary Materials S 3). The scheduling interval is set
as 0.5 h, according to the U.K. energy market settlement pe-
riod [7]. The data of centralised prices of energy and carbon
allowance is obtained from the U.K. energy retail market [48]
and the U.K. carbon market [15] (the E.U. ETS plus the U.K.
carbon price support), respectively. These centralised prices
are set as the minimal accepted bidding price of each seller,
such that during the auction process, the buyers can provide
higher prices than the centralised prices through solving their
own objective function to decide optimal bidding prices. As
studied in [18], this design encourages more prosumers to sell
their surplus energy or carbon allowance and reduces the im-
port from central markets. The smart contract is written in the
Solidity 0.6.0 and executed on the Ethereum virtual machine.
The prosumer-centric and MT-centric algorithms are developed
by using MATLAB and solved by optimisation toolbox.
4.1. Benchmark
To illustrate the efficiency of the proposed trading frame-
work, the following trading schemes are used as benchmarks.
4.1.1. Centralised Trading
The trading of energy or carbon allowance is only performed
on the centralised markets. The prices of energy [47] and car-
bon allowance [15] in central markets are applied in the cen-
tralised trading.
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Fig. 3. Modified IEEE 37-bus test feeder. The network is partitioned into 5 mi-
crogrids. Each bus represents a prosumer. The DRESs are arbitrarily assigned
to each microgrid by connecting to prosumers’ nodes.
4.1.2. Aggregator-based Trading
As the trading framework in [22], the reshaping of prosump-
tion behaviours is managed by relatively decentralised agents,
i.e. aggregators, with the same objectives of minimising bills
for buyers or maximising profits for sellers. Aggregators then
pay prosumers the monetary compensation for the reshaping.
The trading of energy or carbon allowance is only performed
by aggregators.
4.2. Balance of Energy and Carbon Allowance
Fig. 4 shows the total power balance of the modified IEEE
37-bus test feeder. The positive net power means the total gen-
eration is greater than the total demand. The negative net power
means the total generation is less than the total demand, and the
distribution network has to import energy from the main grid.
Through the proposed peer-to-peer trading framework, the sum-
mation of daily net energy is 0.99kWh, which indicates a better
energy balance, compared to -4.50kWh in the aggregator-based
trading and -46.44kWh in the centralised trading.






















Fig. 4. Total Power balance of the modified IEEE 37-bus test feeder. The posi-
tive value of y-axis means the total generation is greater than the total demand.
The negative value of y-axis means the total generation is less than the total
demand.
Fig. 5 shows the surplus carbon allowance of the overall
distribution network. The positive surplus carbon allowance
means the total carbon emissions produced by the distribution
network are less than the total carbon allowance, whereas the
negative surplus carbon allowance means the total carbon emis-
sions produced by distribution network exceed the total carbon
allowance. The proposed peer-to-peer trading framework can
save total daily carbon emissions from carbon allowance by
1465.90 g with baseload of 235.51 kW, approximately 6 times
higher than the aggregator-based trading (385.91g) and 9 times





























Fig. 5. Surplus carbon allowance of the modified IEEE 37-bus test feeder. The
positive value of y-axis means the total carbon emissions are less than the total
carbon allowance. The negative value of y-axis means the total carbon emis-
sions exceed the total carbon allowance.
higher than the centralised trading (168.65g). It is particularly
for the period from the thirty-sixth scheduling time to the forty-
eighth scheduling time, during which more carbon emissions
are saved. Although the aggregator-based trading also achieves
the carbon saving during this period, it results in that the carbon
emissions exceed the carbon allowance during the period from
the twenty-second scheduling time to the thirty-fifth scheduling
time.
4.3. Interface Between Scheduling and Smart Contract
The optimal energy scheduling and bidding prices for each
of the individual prosumers obtained by prosumer-centric algo-
rithm are shown in Fig. 6, relative to the case with no schedul-
ing, i.e. original prosumption. For the microgrid at scheduling
intervals during which all prosumers of this microgrid cannot
generate surplus energy to trade, there is no energy seller and
bidding price. By comparing the scheduled prosumption and
original prosumption, it can be observed that during the peak
demand periods for a majority of prosumers (from the twelfth
scheduling time to the thirty-sixth scheduling time), the gen-
eration is scheduled to increase whereas the consumption is
shifted to the off-peak demand periods (rest scheduling time).
When the prosumers experience high power consumption and
low power generation, by appropriately scheduling, the bidding
prices stabilise at around 10 pence/kWh without dramatic in-
crease. The slight fluctuation of bidding prices dynamically re-
flect the actual supply-demand balance of power.
The interface between scheduling decisions and smart con-
tract is shown in Fig. 7. Through solving prosumer-centric
algorithm, the optimal bidding prices of prosumers as buyers
(indicated by the colourbar) are automatically sent to smart con-
tract for auction. The highest bidding prices (indicated by the
red line) would be accepted by sellers. For the microgrid at
scheduling intervals during which all prosumers of this micro-
grid cannot generate surplus energy to trade, there is no auction
proceeded (indicated by the scheduling intervals without the red
line). It can be seen from Fig. 7 that the auctions are proceeded
over all the scheduling intervals of day at microgrid 4, whereas
the auctions are only proceeded at a few scheduling intervals at
microgrid 2. This is because the capacity of distributed gener-
ation at microgrid 2 cannot meet the demand. The MT 2 has
to help its prosumers buy the energy from other MTs. Addi-
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Fig. 6. Optimal energy scheduling and bidding prices obtained by prosumer-centric algorithm (relative to the case with no scheduling). The left y axes indicate the
power of individual prosumers, and the right y axes indicate the optimal bidding prices. The x axes indicate the scheduling time of day.
the selling prices are stabilised between 6 pence/kWh and 10
pence/kWh over all the scheduling intervals, which is differ-
ent from the aggregator-based trading [22] with dramatic peak
prices and off-peak prices. The auction prices decided by in-
dividual prosumers can accurately target on the actual supply-
demand relationship of prosumers.
4.4. Smart Contract Execution
The proposed auction mechanism is performed in the form
of smart contract on the Ethereum blockchain. Fig. 8 shows an
example of procedure for executing the auctions of energy and
carbon allowance on the microgrid 5. Prosumers at bus 706 and
bus 724 are energy sellers to supply 319Wh and 109Wh energy,
respectively. Prosumers at bus 706, bus 724, and bus 725 are
carbon allowance sellers to supply 7g, 113g, and 123g carbon
allowance, respectively. The sellers call the initialisation func-
tion from the full node to specify offer conditions. Prosumers at
bus 722 and bus 725 are energy buyers with the demand of 419
Wh and 202 Wh, respectively. Prosumers at bus 722 is carbon
allowance buyer with the demand of 117g. The bids and offers
are matched by the proposed matching criteria. For the auction
of carbon allowance, there is a single buyer with multiple sell-
ers. To meet the 117g demand of carbon allowance, prosumer
at bus 722 has the options of 1) buying 123 g allowance from
prosumer at bus 725 with 4 pence/kg of bidding price; 2) buy-
ing 113g from prosumer at bus 724 with 3pence/kg of bidding
price and buying another 7 g from prosumer at bus 706 with 3
Fig. 7. Optimal bidding prices of energy buyers as an input of smart con-
tract. The y-axis indicates the bus number of prosumers, assigned to corre-
sponding microgrids. The x-axis indicates the scheduling time of day. The
colourbar indicates the optimal bidding prices from each prosumer for a given
0.5 h scheduling interval. The red line indicates the highest bidding prices ac-
cepted by energy sellers. The scheduling interval without the red line means
there is no surplus energy on the microgrid to trade.
pence/kg of bidding price. According to the matching criteria,
the second option would be selected.
For the auction of energy, there are multiple buyers with mul-
tiple sellers. For the offer of selling 109 kWh energy by pro-
sumer at bus 724, prosumers at bus 725 and bus 722 attempt to
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bid as buyers. The prosumer at bus 725 wins this auction with
the 7pence/kWh of the highest bidding price. The unsuccessful
buyer at bus 722 then calls the withdraw function from the full
node to withdraw its bid. Once confirming the energy or carbon
allowance is supplied, the smart contract pays to the sellers with
the highest bids. The residual 216 g of carbon allowance from
prosumer at bus 725 and 100Wh energy demand from prosumer
at bus 722 are aggregated by MT 5 to trade with other MTs.
Fig. 8. Execution of smart contract based auction on the peer-to-peer trading
platform. The black line is the execution of the energy trading, and the dashed
blue line is the execution of the carbon allowance trading.
5. Conclusion
To achieve the regional energy balance and reduction of car-
bon emissions on distribution networks, a peer-to-peer trad-
ing framework is proposed to exchange energy and carbon
allowance. The trading is proceeded under the standardised
and self-enforcing smart contract. The optimal bidding/selling
prices of prosumers and energy reshaping decisions are yielded
by the proposed prosumer-centric and microgrid-trader-centric
algorithms. The designed decentralised low carbon incentive
mechanism provides macro policy makers with a potential pol-
icy design for carbon mitigation in energy sector, which allows
the monetary incentive of carbon reduction to be accurately al-
located according to the real-time prosumption behaviours in
specific location and time period. Simulation results show that
the proposed peer-to-peer trading framework is capable of ex-
porting 0.99 kWh of daily energy to the main grid and save
1465.90 g of daily carbon emissions from carbon allowance,
outperforming the aggregator-based trading and the centralised
trading. The proposed trading framework and demonstrated
benefits can encourage more passive consumers to invest in the
DRESs and participate in the local energy exchange.
The idiosyncratic prosumption patterns of individual pro-
sumers are worth for further investigation. For instance, if a
prosumer has high price elasticities of generation and buying
carbon allowance, whereas low price elasticities of consump-
tion during the peak demand period, this prosumer is inher-
ently willing to increase generation irrespective of generating
costs and carbon price. However, this prosumer is reluctant to
curtail or shift consumption. Considering these features into
the scheduling to decide the prosumption behaviours and bid-
ding/selling prices can be taken as a future work.
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• A trading framework is designed enabling the exchange of
energy and carbon allowance at both prosumer level and
microgrid level.
• The self-enforcing nature of smart contract is exploited to
automate standardised auction procedure.
• The bidding/selling prices of energy and prosumer-centric
low carbon incentive directly target on reshaping individ-
ual prosumption behaviours.
• Results prove that the proposed framework facilitates re-
gional energy balance and carbon saving.
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